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coordination failures may prevent eﬃciency in the choice of product
characteristics. More fundamentally, even if we have eﬃcient product
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entry equilibrium. Our results apply to a large class of models of prod-
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We investigate the eﬃciency of free-entry equilibria when ﬁrms have the
ability to practice perfect price discrimination, constrained only by the com-
petition they face from rival ﬁrms, and unconstrained by informational lim-
itations about consumer characteristics. There is much work examining
the eﬃciency consequences of imperfect price discrimination in the context
of oligopoly or monopolistic competition—Armstrong and Vickers (1998),
Borenstein (1985), Corts (1998), Katz (1984), Rochet and Stole (1999) and
Stole (1995) are prominent examples.
1 However, apart from the early work
of Spence (1976), previous work on perfect price discrimination has been
limited, perhaps because of Spence’s sweeping conclusion that “if sellers
can price discriminate in an appropriate sense, the welfare aspects of the
product choice problem are eliminated” (pp. 217–8). Spence’s argument is
simple and seems compelling. With perfect price discrimination, each seller
will be able to capture her marginal contribution to consumer welfare and
hence her proﬁts coincide with her marginal contribution to social welfare.
In consequence, a producer will choose her product variety so as to max-
imize her marginal contribution, i.e., to maximize social welfare. Finally,
entry decisions will be eﬃcient, since a ﬁrm will enter the market if and
only if its marginal contribution exceeds the entry cost.
The implication of Spence’s argument is that ineﬃciencies arise in models
of oligopoly only because consumer characteristics are private information
(or perhaps if there are legal restrictions on price discrimination) and not
due to the exercise of market power per se. Spence’s argument also ﬁnds
application to models of common agency with perfect information (Berhneim
and Whinston, 1986), which have been widely used to study the labor market
as well as the lobbying process. Spence’s argument suggests that if one can
ensure that each principal or lobbyist can capture her marginal contribution
to the agent’s utility, then this would imply that investment/entry incentives
for the principal are correctly speciﬁed and the overall outcome will be
eﬃcient, from the point of view of the principals and the agent.
2
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the welfare consequences of per-
fect price discrimination. We ﬁnd that Spence’s argument is correct, but
only in some respects. For example, if the number of ﬁrms is given, each
ﬁrm will choose product variety so as to maximize its contribution to social
welfare and hence variety choices correspond to a decentralized maximum of
social welfare. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a general tendency to excessive entry,
even if each ﬁrm captures its marginal contribution to social welfare. The
key question to ask is, “what is the marginal contribution relative to?” We
1See also the survey by Varian, who discusses the welfare consequences of imperfect
price discrimination extensively.
2This point has been emphasized by Bergemann and Valimaki (1999), who consequently
focus on the conditions under which each principal gets her marginal contribution in
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ﬁnd that the marginal ﬁrm captures its marginal contribution relative to an
ineﬃcient allocation rather than an eﬃcient one and this is the reason why
there is excessive entry.
The basic argument is as follows. Assume that for any integer n, if n ﬁrms
enter, they will choose their product characteristics and outputs so as to
maximize social welfare. Denote this optimal choice by ³ = (³1;³2;:::;³n),
where ³i denotes the choice of ﬁrm i. On the other hand, if n ¡ 1 ﬁrms




n¡1). Hence the increase in welfare due to the entry of the
marginal ﬁrm is W(³) ¡ W(³0). However, the proﬁts of the marginal ﬁrm,
n, are given by its marginal contribution to social welfare at the vector ³ so
that proﬁts equal W(³)¡W(³1;³2;:::;³n¡1). Since ³0 is welfare maximizing
when there are n¡1 ﬁrms, it follows that W(³0) ¸ W(³1;³2;:::;³n¡1) and
hence the proﬁts of the marginal ﬁrm are always greater than its contribution
to social welfare. In consequence, there will always be too much entry.
This argument demonstrates excess entry, in a weak sense. In a wide
variety of models of monopolistic competition, we ﬁnd the optimal out-
put/product variety choices are sensitive to the number of entrants. In all
such models, the above inequality is strict, so that excess entry obtains in
a strict sense. This is true, for example, in many models of “locational”
competition, such as the Salop or Hotelling models and in models of verti-
cal diﬀerentiation. It is also true in several representative consumer models
such as the models due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Spence (1976).3
Our basic result, that there is excessive entry, holds in discrete choice
models (where each consumer only consumes a single variety) as well as
representative consumer models, where the consumer desires variety. We
discuss the former class of model in Section 2 and the latter in Section 3.
In each case, we begin with a concrete example before proceeding to a more
general analysis. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of our analysis
for common agency models and the ﬁnal Section concludes.
2. Discrete Choice Models
We now analyze the eﬃciency of entry in models where consumers are het-
erogeneous and where each consumer consumes at most one type of product.
3Lederer and Hurter (1986) and MacLeod et al. (1988) also analyze spatial models
where the ﬁrm’s ability to absorb transport costs permits perfect price discrimination.
Lederer and Hurter analyze a two-ﬁrm Hotelling style location model, while MacLeod et al.
analyze a more general spatial model. These papers focus on the fact that discriminatory
pricing allows the existence of pure strategy locational equilibria in contexts (such as the
Hotelling model with linear transport costs) where non-discriminatory pricing does not
permit existence. They also note that locational equilibria can have multiple equilibria, so
that global eﬃciency is not ensured. While we discuss these arguments in greater detail
in context, our basic point is diﬀerent from theirs—we show that ineﬃciency arises in free
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Such models are termed discrete choice models.4 The extensive form we an-
alyze has three stages, as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, each potential ﬁrm
(from an inﬁnite or suﬃciently large set) must decide whether to enter or
not. Let N = f1;2;:::ng be the set of entrants. In stage 2, each entrant
ﬁrm observes n, the number of entrants in stage 1 and the entrants choose
a product variety. In stage 3, ﬁrms compete by oﬀering a consumer speciﬁc
price to each consumer. Throughout, we shall focus attention on pure strat-
egy equilibria. If we were to allow mixed equilibria, these would typically be
ineﬃcient and one could not expect price discrimination to ensure eﬃciency.
It will be useful to begin with an analysis of models of spatial competi-
tion, as in Hotelling or Salop’s (1979), before proceeding to a more general
analysis.
2.1. The Salop Model. A unit measure of consumers is uniformly dis-
tributed around the unit circle (as in Salop) or the interval [0;1] (Hotelling).
Consumers have unit demands (with reservation values v) and incur a trans-
port cost—if the consumer located at x purchases from the ﬁrm located at
y, the transport cost incurred is T(x ¡ y). We assume that T(z) = T(¡z)
for all z and that T(z) is strictly increasing if z > 0 and diﬀerentiable ex-
cept possibly at zero. Normalize T(0) to equal zero. An example is where
T(x¡y) = tjx¡yj®; ® = 1 corresponds to the case of linear transportation
costs, originally used by Salop. Marginal costs are constant and normalized
to zero and ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost F if they enter the market. We assume
that there are inﬁnitely many potential ﬁrms, i.e., the number of potential
entrants is greater than the number which actually enter in any equilibrium.
2.1.1. Competitive Price Discrimination. Consider the consumer who is lo-
cated at point x and purchases the product at price pi(x) from ﬁrm i located
at point yi. The utility from this purchase is given by
v ¡ T(x ¡ yi) ¡ pi(x):
With perfect price discrimination, ﬁrms compete separately for each con-
sumer. Hence one has Bertrand competition for each consumer and the ﬁrm
(i) which is nearest to the consumer will limit price the ﬁrm which is the
next nearest. Let g(x) = argmini2N jx¡yij be the index of the closest ﬁrm,
which is located at yg(x) and let h(x) = argmini2Nnfg(x)g jx¡yij be the index
of the next closest ﬁrm, which is located at yh(x). Two possibilities arise: if
v¡T(x¡yh(x)) ¸ 0, ﬁrm h(x) can eﬀectively compete for the customer and










4Note however that consumers may purchase variable amounts of the single good that
they choose to consume. Anderson et al. (1992) provide an excellent overview of discrete
choice models.4 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO




< 0, ﬁrm g(x) only competes with the
consumer’s reservation utility and will sell to the consumer at a price





In either case, the pricing stage ensures eﬃcient provision—the consumer
buys if and only if it is eﬃcient to buy and always buys from the right ﬁrm.
For the remainder of this section we shall assume that consumer pref-
erences and ﬁrm locations are such that ﬁrms eﬀectively compete for each
consumer. This is purely for expositional ease. Hence, each consumer buys
from the nearest ﬁrm and pays a price which equals the diﬀerence between
her utility from buying from this ﬁrm and her utility from buying from the
next nearest ﬁrm at price zero.
2.1.2. Location Choice. Assume that n ¸ 3 ﬁrms have entered the market
and must simultaneously choose locations in stage 2 of the game deﬁned
above. We now show that given the equilibrium locations of the n¡1 other
ﬁrm, the ﬁrm concerned will choose its location so as to maximize it con-
tribution to social welfare. In other words, there is an equivalence between
equilibrium locations and locations which are decentralized maximizers of
social welfare. A locational conﬁguration is a decentralized maximizer of
social welfare if no single ﬁrm can increase welfare by altering its location.
Note that a decentralized maximizer need not maximize social welfare glob-
ally. However, in the case of the Salop and Hotelling models, it turns out
that any decentralized maximizer also maximizes social welfare globally.
Consider the location choice of a ﬁrm which is considering locating at a
point y between the equilibrium locations of two other ﬁrms. Normalize the
locations of these ﬁrms to 0 and a respectively, so that a > y > 0 (if y = 0
or y = a, the ﬁrm makes zero revenue since there is Bertrand competition
for each consumer). We shall show that y¤ = a=2 is the optimal location
choice for this ﬁrm.











[T(a ¡ x) ¡ T(x ¡ y)]dx:
On the other hand, the total welfare of consumers located in [0;a], as a















After some manipulation, we ﬁnd
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Hence R(y) is identical to W(y) except for a constant term which is inde-
pendent of y. Hence a ﬁrm which locates between any two other ﬁrms will
choose a welfare optimal location.
The welfare optimal location in the interval [0;a] can be obtained from
the ﬁrst order condition










T0(x ¡ y)dx = 0:












Hence y¤ = a=2, which is the unique optimum since T(¢) is strictly increas-
ing.5
Finally we note from the expressions for revenue and welfare that both
are greatest when the length of the integral, a, is largest. Therefore any
ﬁrm will pick a location such that a) the distance between its neighbors, a,
is largest and b) locate half-way between these two neighbors. These two
conditions must be satisﬁed for every ﬁrm if we have a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in locations. It follows, that in any such Nash equilibrium, ﬁrms
must be equally spaced around the circle since otherwise, for at least one
ﬁrm, its distance to its left-hand neighbor must diﬀer from its distance to
its right-hand neighbor.
Similarly, in the case of the Hotelling model of competition between two
ﬁrms on the line, we ﬁnd that Nash equilibrium locations are welfare opti-
mal. Such optimality is obtained uniquely at 1=4 and 3=4 for any strictly
increasing transport cost function. This contrasts with the sub-optimality
of equilibrium locations in the absence of price discrimination—e.g., with
quadratic transport costs, one has maximal diﬀerentiation.
To summarize, we have found that price-discriminating ﬁrms will choose
locations in a welfare optimal way, and have also explicitly characterized
such locations.6 Hence we ﬁnd that price discrimination ensures eﬃciency
at pricing as well as location stages.
2.1.3. Free Entry. We now analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game, where ﬁrms
enter. If n ﬁrms enter the market, they will space themselves equally in
stage 2. Hence the proﬁts earned by each ﬁrm, ¼(n), is given by














5It is easily checked that the second order condition is also satisﬁed at this optimum.
6If n = 2 so that there are only two ﬁrms, it is easy to show that Nash equilib-
rium/welfare optimal locations must lie on a diameter of the circle.6 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
This can be re-written as










Since T is strictly increasing, T(1=n¡x) is decreasing in n and hence ¼(n)
is a strictly decreasing function, which tends to ¡F as n ! 1. If we assume
that the market is suﬃciently large so that a monopolist makes positive
proﬁts, this establishes that there is a unique value of n at which proﬁts are
zero—call this value n¤. If one requires n to only take integer values, there
is similarly a unique value, n¤, such that ¼(n¤) ¸ 0 and ¼(n¤ +1) < 0. This
establishes that there is a unique equilibrium outcome under free entry.
How does this equilibrium compare with the social optimum? Let so-
cial welfare, W, be measured by the sum of consumer surplus and prof-
its. Clearly, with n ﬁrms, maximizing welfare requires that these ﬁrms are
equally spaced. Maximizing W is hence equivalent to minimizing the sum
of consumer transport costs and total ﬁxed costs.





Let ∆W(n) = W(n) ¡ W(n ¡ 1) be the change in social welfare due to the
entry of the nth ﬁrm.










We now compare the proﬁts of the additional ﬁrm with its contribution
to social welfare and show that proﬁts are always larger. The intuition for
this result comes from comparing (7) and (9). Note that the last two terms
in both these equations are identical—i.e., the ﬁxed cost and the transport
cost involved for consumers purchasing from this ﬁrm enter both expressions
in the same way. Hence the comparison only depends upon the ﬁrst term.
Note that proﬁts depend upon the integral of T(x) over the range 1=2n to
1=n—these capture the opportunity cost for the consumers of buying from
the nearest competitor. On the other hand, the contribution to welfare
depends upon (n ¡ 1) times the integral over the range 1=2n to 1=2(n ¡ 1),
a range which is n ¡ 1 times smaller. Breaking the ﬁrst term in the proﬁt
function into a sum over n¡1 integrals over intervals of length 1=(2n(n¡1))
yields:
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with equality for l = 1 and strict inequality for l > 1. This implies that
(12)











This veriﬁes that the proﬁt of the nth ﬁrm exceeds its contribution to social
welfare. Hence there must be excessive entry.
Why does free entry not produce the eﬃcient number of ﬁrms? To un-
derstand this, consider optimal locations with n ¡ 1 ﬁrms in the market.
These locations are equally spaced around the circle, so that each ﬁrm is at
distance 1=(n ¡ 1) from its neighbor. If n ﬁrms enter the market, they will
locate equi-distantly and hence at distance 1=n from each other. Hence the
welfare contribution of the marginal (nth) ﬁrm is the diﬀerence in welfare
between the latter and the former situation. On the other hand, the proﬁts
of the marginal ﬁrm equal its contribution to welfare when the other n ¡ 1
ﬁrms are unequally spaced, so that the distance between ﬁrms 1 and ﬁrm
n ¡ 1 is 2=n, while the distances between all other adjacent pairs of ﬁrms
is 1=n. Hence the proﬁts of the marginal ﬁrm are given by its marginal
contribution to welfare relative to an ineﬃcient conﬁguration of n¡1 ﬁrms,
whereas its contribution to welfare is its marginal contribution relative to an
eﬃcient conﬁguration of n ¡ 1 ﬁrms. Hence proﬁts are excessive and there
is excess entry.
One can explicitly compute equilibrium outcomes and the social optimum
for simple speciﬁcations of the transport cost function. Consider the case of
transport costs of the form (T(z) = tjzj®). Ignoring integer constraints, the
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In this case n¤ =
p
2ˆ n. In the case of quadratic transport costs (® = 2), we
ﬁnd that n¤ =
3 p








Finally, it is worth comparing outcomes in the linear transport cost case







Hence price discrimination reduces excessive entry to some extent, but does
not ensure full eﬃciency.
2.2. A General Discrete Choice Model. We now consider a general
discrete model of product diﬀerentiation and explore the conditions under
which eﬃciency is ensured with perfect price discrimination. We use our
canonical model, where entry takes place in stage 1, product characteristics
(“location”) are chosen in stage 2 and prices are chosen in stage 3. In order
to ensure eﬃciency, we must have three features. First, in the pricing stage it
must be the case that each ﬁrm can capture exactly its marginal contribution
to consumer welfare. Second, we must have eﬃciency in the location stage.
Finally, given eﬃciency on these counts, we must have eﬃcient entry. We
shall show that eﬃciency can be obtained on the ﬁrst two counts, under
certain assumptions, but is never obtained on the third count.
Let us assume that n ﬁrms have entered, indexed by i 2 f1;2;:::;ng = N.
Assume that each ﬁrm i must choose µi 2 Θ where Θ is a compact metric
space. We interpret µi as the characteristic of the product or “location” for
short. Let µ = (µ1;µ2;:::;µn) 2 Θn denote the vector of location choices.
We now analyze the pricing stage of the game where each ﬁrm i makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to each consumer j.
We assume that each consumer purchases only one of the n varieties
oﬀered. Let ¸j 2 Λ parameterize the utility of consumer j and let this
be distributed with a density f(j). Let u(x
j
i;µi;¸j) + Z denote the utility
of the consumer with characteristic ¸j when she consumes x
j
i units of the
product with characteristic µi and Z units of an outside numeraire. Let
c(µi) denote the (constant) marginal cost of ﬁrm i when it produces the
product with characteristic µi. Let ˆ x
j







i and let b(µi;¸j) denote the maximized value. Let
N0 = N [ f0g be the set of ﬁrms, augmented by the outside option of non-
consumption. The net beneﬁt of the outside option, which we denote by
b(µ0;¸j), is zero for every ¸j. Let Á(µ;¸j) = argmaxi2N0 bj(µi;¸j) be the
index of the ﬁrm which provides the greatest net beneﬁt to consumer j.
If we think of ﬁrms competing Bertrand fashion in oﬀering beneﬁts to
the consumer then in equilibrium each ﬁrm i 6= Á(µ;¸j) oﬀers the consumer
b(µi;¸j) whereas ﬁrm Á(µ;¸j) 2 N oﬀers maxi2N0nfÁ(￿;¸j)g b(µi;¸j). LetPERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 9
Φi(µ) be the set of consumers j such that ﬁrm i = Á(µ;¸j). The expression



























The second line of equation (14) follows from our assumption that b(µ0;¸j) =
0 and the fact that argmaxk2N0nfig b(µk;¸j) is the variety that consumer j
would purchase in the absence of variety i. It is straightforward to see that
Φk(µ¡i) \ Φi(µ) is the set of consumers ﬁrm k loses to ﬁrm i.
We now claim that
(15) ¼i(µ) = W(µ) ¡ W(µ¡i):




j2Φk(￿) b(µk;¸j)f(j)dj¡(n¡1)F to the ﬁrst
term and also to the second term. The ﬁrst term now becomes W(µ). The
second term becomes W(µ¡i), since adding Φk(µ), the set of k’s remaining
consumers, yields Φk(µ¡i).
Hence we see that each ﬁrm’s proﬁts, as a function of its chosen charac-
teristic µi, are equal to welfare as a function of µi less a constant which does
not depend on µi. Therefore the proﬁt maximizing characteristic µ¤
i also
maximizes welfare and vice versa. Indeed, it follows that any decentralized
maximizer of welfare must be a Nash equilibrium and conversely every Nash
equilibrium must be a decentralized welfare maximizer.
The following example shows that one may have several characteristic
vectors which are decentralized maximizers of welfare, whereas only one of
these maximizes welfare globally. Since any decentralized maximizer is a
Nash equilibrium, this shows that one can have coordination failures which
prevent eﬃciency. One cannot expect price discrimination to prevent such
coordination failures.
Example 1. Let there be two ﬁrms, N = f1;2g and let the set of possible
locations equal Θ = f1;2;3;4;5g. A unit mass of consumers is distributed
across these locations, with a mass ®i at location i. Each consumer has
inelastic unit demand for the product and incurs a transport cost—if the
consumer at i purchases from the ﬁrm at location j, the transport cost is
T(minfj i ¡ j j;j i + 5 ¡ j jg). If the two ﬁrms locate at diﬀerent places,
then the maximum distance that any consumer has to travel is 2. Let
0 = T(0) < T(1) < T(2). The welfare criterion is therefore the sum of
transport costs incurred by all the consumers in this market. Furthermore,10 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
assume that T(2) is suﬃciently large relative to T(1), so that max®iT(1) <
minj ®jT(2)—this ensures that it is never optimal the two ﬁrms to locate
adjacent to each other. For example, if the ﬁrms locate at (1;2), total
transport costs are (®3 + ®5)T(1) + ®4T(2), whereas if locations are (1;3),
transport costs are (®2 + ®4 + ®5)T(1), and the latter is strictly lower by
our assumption. Let ®2 > ®1 > ®3 > ®4 > ®5. It follows that (1;3) is a
decentralized maximizer of the welfare function, with total transport cost
(®2+®4+®5)T(1). To verify this, note that neither ﬁrm can raise welfare by
moving to location 2 and nor can the ﬁrm at 1 raise welfare by moving to 5
or the ﬁrm at 3 by moving to 4, by our assumption that T(2) is large relative
to T(1). If the ﬁrm at 1 moves to location 5, the increase in transport costs
is (®1 ¡ ®5)T(1) which is strictly positive. Similarly, if ﬁrm at 3 moves to
location 4, the increase in transport costs is (®3 ¡®4)T(1), which is strictly
positive. One can also verify that (2;4) is a decentralized maximizer of the
welfare function. Both these decentralized maximizers are Nash equilibria in
the game where ﬁrms choose locations. The global maximum of the welfare
function depends upon the relative sizes of (®1 + ®3) and (®2 + ®4): if the
former is larger, (1;3) is globally optimal, whereas if the latter is larger,
(2;4) is globally optimal. Hence Nash equilibria need not globally maximize
welfare.
It is also instructive to consider the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. In the equilibrium
(1;3), the ﬁrm at 1 earns ®5[T(2)¡T(1)], while the ﬁrm at 3 earns ®4[T(2)¡
T(1)]. In the equilibrium (2;4), the ﬁrm at 2 earns ®1[T(2) ¡ T(1)], while
the ﬁrm at 4 earns ®5[T(2)¡T(1)]. Hence the proﬁt vector at (2;4) weakly
dominates (in sense of a vector inequality) the proﬁt vector at (1;3), even
though welfare may well be greater at (1;3). In consequence ﬁrms may not
have any incentives to coordinate their decisions in order to achieve a welfare
optimum.
In Example 1, the distribution of consumer valuations is asymmetric,
which gives rise to multiple decentralized maximizers with distinct welfare
levels. Lederer and Hurter (1986) have also provided a similar example.
They analyze price discrimination in the context of a two-ﬁrm Hotelling type
model and show that equilibrium locations need not be globally optimal.
Conversely, in the standard symmetric Hotelling and Salop models, every
locational conﬁguration which is a decentralized maximizer of welfare also
maximizes welfare globally.7 For example, given any locational conﬁguration
with n¡1 ﬁrms located arbitrarily around the circle, the nth ﬁrm will choose
to locate between the two ﬁrms which are maximally far apart and will also
locate equidistant between them. Therefore, in any Nash equilibrium, ﬁrms
are equally spaced, since otherwise some ﬁrm could do better. Decentralized
location decisions lead to a global optimum given the symmetry of this
model.
7The decentralized maximizer is unique in Hotelling, while in the Salop model, there
is a continuum of decentralized maximizers, all of which yield identical levels of welfare.PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 11
We now investigate the eﬃciency of free entry equilibrium. Since free
entry can only ensure eﬃciency if there is eﬃciency in the post entry game,
let us now assume:
Assumption 1. Given n, if the vector µ is a decentralized maximizer of
welfare, µ also maximizes welfare globally.
Let µ¤(n) 2 Θn denote a welfare maximizing conﬁguration of ﬁrm char-
acteristics when n ﬁrms have entered and let W(µ¤(n)) denote the corre-
sponding level of welfare, gross of any ﬁxed costs. If each ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed
cost F of entering, the associated net welfare is W(µ¤(n)) ¡ nF. Hence the
increase in net welfare associated with the entry of the nth ﬁrm is
(16) ∆W(n) = W(µ¤(n)) ¡ W(µ¤(n ¡ 1)):
Consider now the proﬁts of ﬁrm i when there are n ﬁrms which have en-
tered. Let µ¤






¡i(n) is the optimal location of the remaining
n ¡ 1 ﬁrms when n ﬁrms have entered the market and W(µ¤
¡i(n)) is the
contribution to total welfare of these n ¡ 1 ﬁrms at this locational conﬁgu-
ration. From equation (14) and the logic following it, we can rewrite proﬁts
as:
(17) ¼(n) = W(µ¤(n)) ¡ W(µ¤
¡i(n)):
Hence the diﬀerence between proﬁts and the contribution to welfare of the
marginal ﬁrm is given by
(18) ¼(n) ¡ ∆W(n) = W(µ¤(n ¡ 1)) ¡ W(µ¤
¡i(n)):
This expression (18) is always non-negative. To see this, note that µ¤(n ¡ 1)
maximizes welfare when there are n ¡ 1 ﬁrms and hence W(µ¤(n ¡ 1)) ¸
W(µ¤
¡i(n)). Furthermore, in general, µ¤
¡i(n), the optimal locational con-
ﬁguration of n ¡ 1 ﬁrms when n ﬁrms enter the market, will in general be
diﬀerent from µ¤(n ¡ 1), the optimal locational conﬁguration when n ¡ 1
ﬁrms enter and hence (18) will in general be strictly positive. It follows that
we will have too much entry under perfect price discrimination, even when
we have optimal provision of product characteristics with a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrms.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that preferences are such that each consumer con-
sumes at most one variety of the product and Assumption 1 holds.
i) A vector of product variety choices, µ 2 Θn, is an equilibrium when n
ﬁrms enter the market if and only if µ is a decentralized maximizer of
total welfare.
ii) If product variety choices are always eﬃcient for any number of en-
trants, then the proﬁts of the marginal entrant are always greater than
its contribution to social welfare.12 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
Our analysis applies to a wide variety of models of product diﬀerentia-
tion. Indeed, it is particularly easy to check in applications whether one
has eﬃciency or not. Most standard models in the literature are suﬃciently
symmetric that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, i.e., for a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms,
locational equilibria are eﬃcient. Free entry ensures eﬃciency if and only if
it is the case that the set of locations in an eﬃcient locational conﬁguration
with n¡1 ﬁrms is a subset of the set of eﬃcient locations when there are n
ﬁrms. Using this insight, one can verify the following.
(1) Consider the model of vertical diﬀerentiation, as in Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1980) or Shaked and Sutton (1983), where consumers are
heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to pay for quality and
where providing higher quality is also costly. The set of optimal
qualities when there are n¡1 entrants is not, in general, a subset of
the set of optimal qualities when there are n entrants. For example,
it is easily veriﬁed that with one ﬁrm, the optimal quality is inter-
mediate between the optimal quality pair when there are two ﬁrms.
Hence there will be excess entry.
(2) Consider the model of Deneckere and Rothchild (1992),8 where there
are K possible brands and a each consumer has a ranking of these
brands, so that there are K! types of consumer and where each
consumer’s cardinal utility from a product depends only upon its
rank. The distribution of consumer types is symmetric if each of
these K! types is equally numerous. In the symmetric case, it is clear
that every brand of product is equally eﬃcient and hence the entry
decisions will be eﬃcient. However, if the distribution of consumer
types is not symmetric, then the optimal set of brands with n ¡ 1
consumers will not in general be a subset of the set of optimal set
of brands with n consumers. In this case, entry decisions will not be
eﬃcient. It is easy to construct such asymmetric examples.
2.3. Simultaneous Entry and Location Choice. Our results are very
diﬀerent from Spence, who argued that with perfect price discrimination, one
has optimal product variety. His result depends crucially on the assumption
that ﬁrms must simultaneously make their entry and location decisions. To
understand Spence’s argument, let us return to the Salop model and consider
a situation where n ¡ 1 ﬁrms are already in the market, at ﬁxed locations
which are equally spaced around the circle. Suppose that an additional ﬁrm,
n, is now given the option to enter the market and consider its entry decision.
If this ﬁrm enters the market, it will be able to capture, as revenues, the
increase in consumer surplus that such entry causes. If these revenues are
greater than its costs, the ﬁrm will enter, but since such revenues are the
ﬁrm’s marginal contribution to social welfare, the ﬁrm’s entry decision will
be eﬃcient. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm does enter, it will choose a location
8This model is closely related to that of Perloﬀ and Salop (1985), so our comments
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which results in the largest marginal contribution to social welfare. In other
words, we see that the ﬁrm’s entry/location decision must be a decentralized
maximizer of social welfare.9
In our model, free entry does not result in social eﬃciency precisely be-
cause the entry of an additional ﬁrm does not leave the locations of the other
n ﬁrms unchanged, since entry takes place in the ﬁrst stage, before location
decisions are made. In eﬀect, if a ﬁrm enters “between” two other ﬁrms, all
the ﬁrms rearrange themselves so that they are now equidistant from each
other in the new situation. This implies that the revenues of the entrant
are greater as compared to the ﬁxed location case, since its two neighbors
make room for it. Hence the equivalence between the marginal contribution
to consumers’ utility and the entrant’s revenues no longer holds and entry
is no longer eﬃcient.
This discussion suggests that the ineﬃcient entry only takes place because
entry decisions aﬀect subsequent location choices. Hence we consider a game
where entry and location choices are made simultaneously, prior to pricing
decisions being taken. In other words, in stage 1 ﬁrms have to decide whether
to enter or not. If they enter, they also have to choose location. In stage
2, ﬁrms observe the entry/location decisions and choose consumer speciﬁc
prices.
Let us analyze the Salop model, using this extensive form. From our
previous analysis of location choice, it follows that any equilibrium must have
the ﬁrms equally spaced, since otherwise a ﬁrm could increase its proﬁts by
changing location. Let ¼(n) be ﬁrm proﬁts given that n ﬁrms have entered at
equally spaced locations. For ¯ n to be an equilibrium, we must have ¼(¯ n) ¸ 0.
We must also have that the proﬁt of an additional entrant must be less than
zero, given the entry and location choices of these n ﬁrms. Any optimal
location for an additional entrant is halfway between two other ﬁrms. The
proﬁts at this conﬁguration are given by ¼(2¯ n), i.e., the proﬁts of a typical
ﬁrm when 2¯ n ﬁrms are equally spaced around the circle. Hence we must
have that the equilibrium satisﬁes f¯ n j ¼(¯ n) ¸ 0 and ¼(2¯ n) · 0g. Clearly
there is a great multiplicity of equilibria here. For example, in the case of









Recall that the social optimum, ˆ n =
p
t=4F, which lies in this range.
Hence the social optimum is an equilibrium, but there is also a continuum
of ineﬃcient equilibria where one has both too many ﬁrms and too few ﬁrms.
This point has been noted by MacLeod et al. (1988), who analyze such a two
stage game with perfect price discrimination. Note also that the excess entry
9Formally, if X is the set of possible locations and we augment this to X [f0g where 0
denotes the decision to stay out, the argument of Proposition 1 shows that such augmented
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equilibrium which obtains in our three stage game is always an equilibrium
in this model.
To summarize, the two stage game has a large number of equilibria, and
in many of these, the ﬁrms make positive proﬁts. These equilibria have the
ﬂavor of entry-deterrence—the ﬁrms that enter choose locations in such a
way as to restrict the number of entrants. However, as is argued by Judd
(1985), if the cost of brand re-positioning is relatively low, such equilibria
are not credible. This is because when an unanticipated rival chooses to
enter, the remaining ﬁrms will prefer to re-brand their product. Therefore
if the cost of re-branding is suﬃciently low, the eﬃcient equilibrium when
entry and variety decisions are simultaneous is not credible.
Finally, we should note that the model implicit in the original Spence
(1976) article is not completely clear. An alternative interpretation suggests
a “citizen-candidate” model of product diﬀerentiation, where each potential
entrant has the technology to produce one variety and one variety only.10
In the Hotelling version of such a model, we would have each potential
entrant located on the unit interval, and each potential entrant would have
to decide whether to enter or not. Such a model has a plethora of ineﬃcient
equilibria—for example, if the ﬁrms located at 1=3 and 2=3 enter, then the
ﬁrm located at 1=4 will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter. Note that each of these
equilibria correspond to decentralized maximizers of social welfare, since the
entrant at 1=3 increases social welfare by entering rather than staying out,
given the decisions of all other ﬁrms.
3. Representative Consumer Models
We now consider representative consumer models. Somewhat diﬀerent
issues arise in such a model, since the consumer’s beneﬁt from one product
depends also on her consumption of other products and hence one needs
additional assumptions to ensure that a ﬁrm will capture its marginal con-
tribution to welfare. Nevertheless, it remains the case that even if a ﬁrm
were to so capture its marginal contribution, we still have excessive entry.
We begin with a simple example, a version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model and
then consider a more general framework.










where ½ 2 (0;1) and ® 2 (0;1). Z denotes the outside good. We assume
also that ﬁrms have constant marginal cost of production c and ﬁxed cost
F. The game is as follows: in the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm decides whether to
10Such a model has the ﬂavor of models of political competition used by Besley and
Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996).PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 15
enter or stay out and in stage 2, ﬁrms make their take it or leave it oﬀers to
the consumer after having observed the number of entrants in stage 1.
If ﬁrm i’s n ¡ 1 rivals produce output, x then i’s proﬁts under perfect
price discrimination is given by
(20) ¼i(xi;x;n) = ((n ¡ 1)x½ + xi
½)®=½ ¡ ((n ¡ 1)x½)®=½ ¡ cxi ¡ F:
In a symmetric equilibrium, each ﬁrm will produce xi = x which solves:
(21) ®x®¡1n(®¡½)=½ = c:
Call this symmetric equilibrium output x¤
n. It is straightforward to see that
x¤
n also maximizes welfare when there are n ﬁrms.
Notice x¤
n is decreasing in n if ½ > ®—this can be interpreted as the case
where there is diminishing marginal utility of the composite good of the
monopolistic competitive sector, i.e., when the products of the sector are
substitutes. Conversely, x¤
n is increasing in n if ½ < ®, so that ®=½ > 1. In
this case, we see that the products are complements. We assume that ® < ½
so that x¤
n is decreasing in n.
Now consider the optimal entry decision under perfect price discrimina-
tion. Given some n, ﬁrms will still choose the optimal level of output to
produce, x¤
n. However, consider the expression for welfare:








½)®=½ ¡ ((n ¡ 1)x¤
n¡1
½)®=½ ¡ ncx¤




n;n) + [((n ¡ 1)x¤
n




½)®=½ ¡ (n ¡ 1)cx¤
n¡1]:
Adding and subtracting ((n¡1)x¤
n
½)®=½ yields the second line. The bracketed
terms following ¼i(x¤
n;x¤
n;n) are total welfare, gross of ﬁxed costs, with n¡1
varieties and when ﬁrms produce x¤
n and x¤
n¡1 respectively. Notice that the
second bracketed term is strictly greater than the ﬁrst since x¤
n¡1 is chosen
optimally when there are n¡1 varieties. Therefore the private value of entry
is strictly greater than the social value of entry.
The rationale for excess entry is similar to the rationale in the discrete
choice model. Given n entrants, equilibrium output for each equals the
welfare maximizing level of output, x¤
n. At this output conﬁguration, each
ﬁrm captures as revenues, its marginal contribution to consumer welfare,
given that every other ﬁrm is producing x¤
n. However, the contribution
to consumer welfare of the marginal entrant is given by the diﬀerence in
consumer utility between the n vector where each ﬁrm produces x¤
n and the
n ¡ 1 vector where each ﬁrm produces x¤
n¡1. Since x¤
n¡1 is welfare optimal
when there are n ¡ 1 ﬁrms, the marginal entrant’s proﬁts are greater than
its contribution to social welfare. Put diﬀerently, the act of entry alters rival
ﬁrms’ optimal output choices so that (20) overstates the social beneﬁt from16 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
entry. This basic rationale extends to a general representative consumer
model.
3.2. A General Representative Consumer Model. Consider now the
case where the representative consumer consumes all varieties of the prod-
uct, supplied by n ﬁrms. Let x = (x1;x2;:::;xn) 2 Rn
+ denote the vector
of choices of these n ﬁrms. Let U(x;µ) + Z be the consumer utility cor-
responding to the chosen characteristics vector µ, the output proﬁle x and
consumption of the outside good Z. Let ei denote the n-vector with a 1
in its ith component and a 0 everywhere else and for any set S ½ N, let
eS =
P
i2S ei. To model non-linear pricing, we assume that ﬁrms can make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to consumers. Firm i’s marginal contribution to
consumer utility at the pair (x;µ) is given by
(24) Mi(x;µ) = U(x;µ) ¡ U((x ¡ eix);µ):
Now suppose that each ﬁrm i makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at the vec-
tor (x;µ) where it demands Mi(x;µ). Clearly the consumer is indiﬀerent
between accepting and refusing the oﬀer of ﬁrm i, given that she accepts all
the oﬀers of the remaining n ¡ 1 ﬁrms. In addition, the consumer must not
be better oﬀ by refusing the oﬀers of two or more ﬁrms.
Assumption 2. For any subset S of ﬁrms, the sum of marginal contributions




Mi(x;µ) · MS(x;µ) = U(x;µ) ¡ U(x ¡ eSx;µ):
If this condition is satisﬁed for every subset S of N, then clearly the
revenues of each ﬁrm i 2 N will equal its marginal contribution, Mi(x;µ).
If this condition is not satisﬁed, then it follows that each ﬁrm cannot cap-
ture its marginal contribution as revenues—if S is a subset of N such that
Assumption 2 is not satisﬁed, and if ﬁrm revenues equal marginal contribu-
tions, then the consumer will be better oﬀ rejecting the oﬀers of all ﬁrms in
S.11
The general condition for equilibrium revenues, (R¤
i(x;µ))i2N, is that for
each i;R¤







i(x;µ) · MS(x;µ);8S ½ N:
In general, if Assumption 2 is not satisﬁed and ﬁrms cannot capture their
marginal contributions, it follows that equilibrium revenues are not unique
11These conditions are analogous to those set out by Bergemann and Valimaki (1999)
and Laussel and Le Breton (1996), in the context of common agency models. We discuss
the relation between models of price discrimination and common agency models in greater
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and that we may have ineﬃcient equilibria. To make this clear, consider the
following example.
Example 2. There are two ﬁrms, N = f1;2g. The consumer can consume
xi 2 f0;1g. Hence at the vector (1;1), ﬁrm 1’s marginal contribution is
U(1;1) ¡ U(0;1), while ﬁrm 2’s marginal contribution is U(1;1) ¡ U(1;0).
The condition (2) reduces to
(28) U(1;1) + U(0;0) · U(0;1) + U(1;0):
This condition says that the utility function U must be sub-modular. If
instead U(1;1) + U(0;0) > U(0;1) + U(1;0), then equilibrium revenues
satisfy R¤
1(1;1) + R¤
2(1;1) = U(1;1) ¡ U(0;0), with R¤
1(1;1) · U(1;1) ¡
U(0;1) and R¤
2(1;1) · U(1;1) ¡ U(1;0). Clearly there is a continuum of
equilibria satisfying these conditions. Suppose now that marginal costs of
production are zero and that the entry ﬁxed costs are F1 and F2. If Fi ·
Mi(1;1) and F1+F2 · U(1;1)¡U(0;0), then it is eﬃcient for both ﬁrms to
enter. However, Nash equilibrium revenues need not cover the ﬁxed cost of
one ﬁrm and hence there exist equilibria which are not eﬃcient. For example,
let U(1;1) = 3, U(0;0) = 0, U(1;0) = U(0;1) = 1. Hence R¤
1 2 [1;2],
R¤
2 = 3 ¡ R¤
1. If F1 + F2 < 3, Fi < 2 for i 2 f1;2g, then eﬃciency requires
that both ﬁrms enter. However if Fi > 1 for some i, then there exists an
equilibrium where ﬁrm i gets revenue less than Fi in the pricing stage and
hence will not enter. Note that there always exists an equilibrium which is
eﬃcient, as well as ineﬃcient equilibria.
In short, we cannot expect that ﬁrms will be able to capture their marginal
contributions unless the submodularity condition is satisﬁed, which ensures
that products are substitutes.
We shall henceforth assume that Assumption 2 is satisﬁed, so that each
ﬁrm’s revenue always equals its marginal contribution to consumer welfare.
In this case, we may write the ﬁrm’s proﬁts as
(29) ¼i(x;µ) = U(x;µ) ¡ U(x ¡ eix;µ) ¡ c(µi)xi ¡ F:
Now examine the choice of output of the ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm chooses xi
to maximize ¼i(xi;x¡i;µ), this is equivalent to maximizing U(xi;x¡i;µ) ¡
c(µi)xi save for a constant term, U(x¡ eix;µ)+ F, which does not depend
upon xi. Since this is the ﬁrm’s contribution to social welfare, this output
choice is decentralized welfare optimal. We therefore conclude that output
choices will be optimal under Assumption 2.
Since product characteristic choice and free entry can be eﬃcient only if
production decisions are eﬃcient, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Given n and µ, if x is a decentralized maximizer of welfare,
x also maximizes welfare globally.
Consider now the choice of product characteristics. Given µ, let x(µ)
denote the welfare maximizing output conﬁguration. Hence we require that18 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
µ maximize




On the other hand, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts at the proﬁle µ are given by
(31) ˜ ¼i(µ) = U(x(µ);µ) ¡ U(x(µ) ¡ eix(µ);µ) ¡ c(µi)xi(µ) ¡ F:
Note that U(x(µ)¡eix(µ);µ) does not depend upon µi, the choice of ﬁrm i.
Intuitively, this says that consumer utility when ﬁrm i produces zero output
does not depend upon the type of product of this ﬁrm. Hence we see that if
each ﬁrm chooses µi to maximize ˜ ¼i(µ), then W(µ) cannot be increased by
altering any single component µi, so that µ is a decentralized maximizer of
social welfare. Our results here are identical to those obtained previously in
the context of the model where each consumer only purchased one type of
product. Every decentralized maximum is a Nash equilibrium and hence a
globally optimal characteristic vector is always a Nash equilibrium. Again,
global eﬃciency is not necessarily ensured.12
We now assume that each ﬁrm can capture its marginal contribution
at the pricing stage (Assumption 2). In conjunction with Assumptions 1
and 3, this implies that the proﬁle of characteristics and output choices are
always globally optimal. We are now in a position where we can examine
the properties of free entry equilibria.
Suppose that n ﬁrms enter the market and will choose product character-
istics µ¤
n and produce outputs x¤
n. We assume that these choices are socially
optimal. Hence the change in welfare associated with the entry of the nth
ﬁrm is





On the other hand, the proﬁts of the marginal ﬁrm n are given by its mar-
ginal contribution:







It follows that the diﬀerence between proﬁts and contribution to welfare is
given by







Recall that by Assumption 1, for any integer m, the proﬁle (x¤
m;µ¤
m) maxi-
mizes the function W(x;µ). Since this true when m = n¡1, it follows that
¼(n) ¡ ∆W(n) ¸ 0 and hence one has excessive entry.
12It is easy to provide an example with complementary goods. Let there be two ﬁrms
and suppose that each ﬁrm i 2 f1;2g must choose µi 2 [0;1], where µi is the quality of the
product. The consumer consumes one or zero units of each product and obtains positive
utility only by consuming both products. If she consumes both products, her utility given
by U(µ1;µ2) = V (min(µ1;µ2)). There will be a multiplicity of pairs µ1 = µ2 which are
decentralized welfare maximizers even though there is only one which is globally optimal.
With heterogenous consumers, we have seen that one can have such coordination failures
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We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition,
which mirrors our previous result for the discrete choice model:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the representative consumer consumes many
varieties of the product and that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisﬁed.
i) Output and product variety choice pair, (x;µ) 2 Rn
+ £ Θn, is an equi-
librium when n ﬁrms enter the market if and only if x and µ are de-
centralized maximizers of total welfare.
ii) If output and product variety choices are always eﬃcient for any number
of entrants, then the proﬁts of the marginal entrant are always greater
than its contribution to social welfare.
4. Common Agency
Our analysis is directly applicable to the model of common agency, in-
troduced by Berhneim and Whinston (1986). This has found extensive ap-
plications, especially in the context of lobbying. The canonical model of
common agency with complete information has a single agent who takes an
action a in some set A, with n principals who oﬀer transfers to the agent
contingent on the action chosen. Berhneim and Whinston introduced the
notion of truthful equilibrium—such truthful equilibria always induce eﬃ-
cient outcomes in this game between the principals. This model has many
commonalities with our analysis of price discrimination—we may think of
the single consumer (or the coalition of all consumers) as a single agent,
while the ﬁrms are analogous to the principals. The action consists of the
consumer’s consumption bundle, with the diﬀerence that the transfers are
from the principal to the agent. Since each ﬁrm only cares about what the
consumer buys from it and is indiﬀerent about the consumer’s other pur-
chases, one does not need the truthful reﬁnement to ensure eﬃciency in this
context.
The question is, do we have eﬃciency in common agency when the prin-
cipals have to undertake prior non-contractible investments which aﬀect
payoﬀs in the common agency game? This question has been raised by
Bergemann and Valimaki (1999). They argue that such eﬃciency can be
ensured if and only if each principal can secure her marginal contribution
in the truthful equilibrium. If this is the case, they argue that investment
incentives are correctly speciﬁed.
Our analysis in the present paper shows that marginal contribution equi-
libria, in which each principal earns her marginal contribution to social
welfare, is not suﬃcient to ensure eﬃciency if one considers the prior invest-
ment decisions of the principal and even more if one considers entry into
the ranks of principals. To see this, let us reformulate our models of spatial
competition—the Salop model and the ﬁve location model of Example 1—as
common agency model. Suppose that there is a single agent, whose loca-
tion will be randomly determined with probability as corresponding to this
spatial model. That is, in the Salop model, the agent’s location will be20 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
randomly determined by the uniform distribution on the circle and in Ex-
ample 1, the probability that the agent is at location i is ®i. Suppose that
the principal’s have to choose locations before the realization of the agent’s
type, and that the agent can work for at most one principal and the value of
this work to the principal concerned is a constant minus the transport cost
incurred. These models are formally identical to the ones we have analyzed
and since there are no externalities between the principals, all equilibria at
the ﬁnal stage, when the principals compete for the agent, are truthful and
are eﬃcient. Furthermore, each principal’s expected return is her expected
marginal contribution. However, as Example 1 demonstrates, the equilibria
of the location stage need not maximize social welfare globally. More fun-
damentally, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that even if one has eﬃciency
at the stage where the principals choose their investment/location decisions,
one will not have eﬃciency in the entry decision. In particular, one always
has excessive entry into the ranks of the principals or lobbyists.
5. Concluding Comments
Does unfettered entry provide the socially optimal number of ﬁrms and
products? While models of monopolistic competition agree that the answer
is no, when ﬁrms cannot price discriminate, they diﬀer on the direction of
the bias. The Salop model shows that there will be overprovision of product
variety, while in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, one may have either overprovision
or underprovision. The literature agrees that there are two conﬂicting eﬀects
at work here. The business stealing eﬀect makes for excessive entry.13 On
the other hand, with linear prices, ﬁrms are unable to appropriate their
contribution to consumer surplus and hence there is a tendency towards
insuﬃcient entry.
Our main result is that quite generally, one has excessive entry if there
is perfect price discrimination. In the light of the discussion above, one
way of thinking about this is that with discriminatory pricing, ﬁrms can
fully appropriate their contribution to consumer surplus and hence only the
business stealing eﬀect remains. An alternative to this intuition is that the
marginal ﬁrm does appropriate its marginal contribution, but relative to
an ineﬃcient allocation rather than an eﬃcient one, as argued by Spence.
Hence proﬁts are greater than its contribution to welfare.
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